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En este artículo el autor examina la obra de Ronald Dworkin y evalúa su legado para la
filosofía jurídica, moral y política. Así, considera entre sus méritos el haber desarrollado una
teoría jurídica original con su metodología distintiva, la cual no solamente ha trascendido la
dicotomía entre derecho natural y positivismo jurídico, sino además ha reintegrado al derecho
como una rama de la moralidad política y defendido como corolario la tesis de la única
respuesta correcta. De esta forma, comienza por identificar el desafío dworkiniano; continúa al
introducir algunas definiciones y distinciones básicas entre jurisprudencia, filosofía jurídica (o
filosofía del derecho) y teoría jurídica (o teoría del derecho), de un lado, y su relación con la
metodología, del otro; después al apuntar las diferentes metodologías disponibles a las teorías
jurídicas, a partir de las distinciones tanto entre descriptiva y prescriptiva o normativa, por
una parte, como entre general y particular, por la otra; luego al revisitar el modelo de Dworkin,
mismo que caracteriza como constructivo, interpretivo (e inclusive argumentativo), evaluativo e
integrativo; y, concluye al reconsiderar en esta luz la tesis de la única respuesta correcta.
Palabras clave:
Teoría

jurídica

y

metodología,

Modelo

argumentativo,

constructivo,

evaluativo,

integrativo e interpretivo, Tesis de la única respuesta correcta, Ronald Dworkin
Abstract:
In this paper the author addresses Ronald Dworkin’s work and assesses his legacy to legal,
moral and political philosophy. And so, considers among its merits having developed an
original legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended the
Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law into a branch of
political morality and defended as a corollary the one right answer thesis. Hence, commences
by identifying the dworkininan challenge; continues by introducing some basic definitions and
distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or philosophy of law) and legal theory (or
theory of law), on the one hand, and its relationship to methodology, on the other hand; later
by pointing out the main methodologies available to legal theories, following the distinctions
between descriptive and prescriptive or normative, on one side, and, general and particular, on
the other; then by revisiting Dworkin’s model, which he characterizes as constructive,
interpretive (and even argumentative), evaluative and integrative; and, concludes by
reconsidering in this light the one right answer thesis.
Keywords:
Legal Theory and Methodology, Argumentative, Constructive, Evaluative, Integrative,
and Interpretive, One Right Answer Thesis, Ronald Dworkin

For all practical purposes, there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.
Ronald Dworkin, ‘No Right Answer?’ (1977)
This “no right answer” thesis cannot be true by default in law any more than in ethics or
aesthetics or morals.
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’ (1996)
Sheldon:
Raj:
Sheldon:

What is the best number? By the way, there’s only one correct answer.
5,318,008?
Wrong! The best number is 73. [Short silence] You’re probably
wondering why?

Leonard:

No.

Howard:

Uh-uh.

Raj:
Sheldon:

We’re good.
73 is the 21st prime number. Its mirror, 37, is the 12th, and its mirror,
21, is the product of multiplying, hang on to your hats, 7 and 3. Heh?
Heh? Did I lie?

Leonard:

We get it! 73 is the Chuck Norris of numbers!

Sheldon:

Chuck Norris wishes! In binary, 73 is a palindrome, 1-0-0-1-0-0-1,
which backwards is 1-0-0-1-0-0-1, exactly the same. All Chuck Norris
backwards gets you is “Sirron Kcuhc”.

Raj:

Just for the record, when you enter 5,318,008 in a calculator, upsidedown it spells “boobies”.

The Big Bang Theory, “The Alien Parasite Hypothesis”, Series 4, Episode 10 (2010).

I. Introduction
Addressing Ronald Dworkin’s work and assessing his legacy are the main aims
of this paper. Let me point out in advance that in my opinion he is the greatest
legal philosopher and theorist ever and is among the most influential moral
and political philosopher of our time. In a few words, he developed an original
legal theory with its distinctive methodology, which not only has transcended
the Natural Law and Legal Positivism dichotomy, but also has reintegrated law
into a branch of political morality and defended as a corollary the one right
answer thesis.

As advanced in the “Introduction” to his celebrated Taking Rights
Seriously he aimed to “define and defend a liberal theory of law” by being
sharply critical of another theory widely thought to be liberal, i.e. the “ruling
theory of law”, which “has two parts and insists on their independence”. The
first part is a “theory about what law is”, i.e. “the theory of legal positivism,
which holds that the truth of legal propositions consists in facts about rules
that have been adopted by specific social institutions, and in nothing else.” The
second is a “theory about what the law ought to be”, i.e. “the theory of
utilitarianism, which holds that law and its institutions should serve the
general welfare, and nothing else.”1
Contrary to the insistence about the independence of both parts, he
claims: “A general theory of law must be normative as well as conceptual.”2
Bear in mind that this claim will allow Dworkin to collapse the distinction
between descriptive and prescriptive:3
Its normative part must treat a variety of topics indicated by the following catalogue. It
must have a theory of legislation, of adjudication, and of compliance; these three
theories look at the normative questions of law from the standpoint of a lawmaker, a
judge, and an ordinary citizen. The theory of legislation must contain a theory of
legitimacy, which describes the circumstances under which a particular person or
group is entitled to make law, and a theory of legislative justice, which describes the law
they are entitled or obliged to make. The theory of adjudication must also be complex: it
must contain a theory of controversy, which sets out standards that judges should use
to decide hard cases at law, and a theory of jurisdiction, which explains why and when
judges, rather than other groups or institutions, should make the decisions required by
the theory of controversy. The theory of compliance must contrast and discuss two
roles. It must contain a theory of deference, which discusses the nature and limits of
the citizen’s duty to obey the law in different forms of state, and under different
circumstances, and a theory of enforcement, which identifies the goals of enforcement

1

Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard UP & Duckworth 1977; 2nd edn

‘with an “Appendix: A Reply to Critics”’, Harvard UP & Duckworth 1978) vii.
2

ibid

3

ibid vii-viii (emphasis added)

and punishment, and describes how official should respond to different categories of
crime or fault.

In a few words, he connects or even --as I will argue-- integrates both
parts, i.e. the normative and the conceptual, not only within a general theory of
law but also with other departments of philosophy. In his own voice:4
The interdependencies of the various parts of a general theory of law are
therefore complex. In the same way, moreover, a general theory of law will have many
connections with other departments of philosophy. The normative theory will be
embedded in a more general political and moral philosophy which may in turn depend
upon philosophical theories about human nature or the objectivity of morality. The
conceptual part will draw upon the philosophy of language and therefore upon logic and
metaphysics… A general theory of law must therefore constantly take up one or another
disputed position on problems of philosophy that are not distinctly legal.

In short, Dworkin’s powerful critique of law as a model or system of rules
and of legal positivism as a form of legal conventionalism, as well as his
conception of law as constructive interpretation, as a chain novel, as integrity,
as an interpretive concept, and as a branch of political morality, among many
other features of his theory, challenged not only the then clearly dominant legal
theory but also its methodology, which claims to be general and descriptive or
even indirectly evaluative but still morally neutral.5
Hence, after identifying Dworkin’s challenge, including the existence of
persistent and pervasive disagreements within the different legal theories that

4

ibid viii-ix

5

See for the early version Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules’ (1967) 35 U of Chi L Rev

14 (reprinted as ‘Model of Rules I’ in Dworkin (n 1); references will be made to this version);
Ronald Dworkin, ‘Social Rules and Legal Theory’ (1972) 81 Yale L J 855 (reprinted as ‘Model of
Rules II’ in Dworkin (n 1); references will be made to this version); and Ronald Dworkin, ‘Hard
Cases’ (1974) 88 Harvard L Rev 1057 (reprinted in Dworkin (n 1); references will be made to
this version), as well as the other essays reprinted or published originally in Dworkin (n 1); see
for the later version, Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard UP 1986); and for the latest
version Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard UP 2011)

arguably describe the same phenomenon,6 but that actually prescribe a
different solution to it, I intend: in section II, to introduce some basic
definitions and distinctions between jurisprudence, legal philosophy (or
philosophy of law) and legal theory (or theory of law), on one side, and its
relationship to methodology, on the other; in section III, to point out the main
methodologies available to legal theories; in section IV, to revisit Dworkin’s
model; and, finally, in section V, to conclude by briefly reconsidering the one
right answer thesis.
II. Definitions and Distinctions
The aim of this section is: first, to introduce some basic definitions and
distinctions between “jurisprudence”, “legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law”,
and “legal theory” or “theory of law”; and, second, to point out their relations to
the so-called “legal methodology” (or “methodology”, for short). Although the
terms “jurisprudence”, “legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law”, and “legal
theory” are used more or less interchangeably, I will like to point out that the
different labels are helpful in order to figure out the underlying “methodology”,
including its scientific, philosophical and theoretical presumptions and
presuppositions.7
Since Roman times, following the famous definitions, placed in a passage
at the beginning of the Digest of Justinian, by Ulpian “Iurisprudentia est
divinarum atque rerum notitia, iusti atque injusti scientia” (i.e. “Jurisprudence is
the knowledge of things divine and human; the science of the just and unjust”),
and by Celso “Ius est ars boni et æqui” (i.e. “Law is the art of the good and fair”),

6

See Dan Priel, ‘Jurisprudential Disagreements and Descriptivism’ (2014) 8 Problema.
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In this section, I am following Larry Solum, ‘Legal Theory Lexicon 044: Legal Theory,

Jurisprudence,

and

the

Philosophy

of

Law’,

in

Legal

Theory

http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/44/legal_theory_le.html

Lexicon
and

http://legaltheorylexicon.blogspot.com/2005/05/legal-theory-lexicon-044-legal-theory.html
accessed 14 November 2014

the word “jurisprudence” denotes the scientific knowledge of “law”, which is its
object or subject-matter.8
Curiously, John Austin in The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (1863),
published thirty-one years after The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
(1832), on the one hand, cautioned that the word “Jurisprudence itself is not
free from ambiguity”, since it has been used to denote both “The knowledge of
Law as a science” and of “Legislation… as the science of what ought to be done
towards making good laws”, but, on the other hand, apparently conceded:
“With us, Jurisprudence is the science of what is essential to law, combined
with the science of what ought to be.”9 Nevertheless, the word “jurisprudence”
is used to refer to a science (or part of it), as well as to the scientific knowledge
of “law”.
Whereas the expressions “legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law” by
using the word “philosophy” suggest that the distinctive knowledge (or at least
the method) is not scientific per se but philosophical, irrespective of whether
there is a close or not relationship between science and philosophy, following
the adagio: “philosophy is the mother of all sciences”. The fact that both

8

John Austin uses this passage from the Roman jurists as an example of the

“2nd.Tendency to confound positive law with positive morality, and both with legislation and
deontology” but nevertheless affirms: “jurisprudence… is the science of law”, see ‘The Province
of Jurisprudence Determined’ (first published 1832) in The Province of Jurisprudence
Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence (Hackett Publishing 1998) Lecture V,
188-90; see ibid 189: “Now jurisprudence, if it is anything, is the science of law, or at most the
science of law combined with the art of applying it; but what it here given as a definition of it,
embraces not only law, but positive morality, and even the test to which both these are to be
referred. It therefore comprises the science of legislation and deontology.”
For Austin’s conception of jurisprudence as a science and its proper province, see ibid
126: “The science of jurisprudence (or, simply and briefly, jurisprudence) is concerned with
positive laws, or with laws strictly so called, as considered without regard to their goodness and
badness” (emphasis original)
9

John Austin, “The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence” (first published 1863) in

Austin (n 8) 372 (emphasis original)

jurisprudence and legal philosophy or philosophy of law, during the XIX and
XX centuries, were done all over the world exclusively by lawyers (or jurists),
without a formal degree on philosophy, reinforced the view that the terms
where used --or at least can be used-- interchangeably. This fact remained
unchallenged until H.L.A Hart, a philosopher by formation, who at some point
planned to become an barrister and hence was studying for the bar before
joining M15 during the Second World War, started --as Nicola Lacey put it-“Selling Philosophy to Lawyers” as “The Chair of Jurisprudence” in Oxford.10
Though I am absolutely convinced that Hart sold analytic or linguistic
philosophy to lawyers, he did still used the terms more or less interchangeably,
but certainly with a clear and distinctive philosophical emphasis.11 In that
sense, I am not completely persuaded that the usage of “jurisprudence” is
reserved for law schools or lawyers (or jurists) and “legal philosophy” or
“philosophy of law” for philosophy departments or philosophers.12 From my
point of view the relevant distinction is whether “jurisprudence” and “legal
philosophy” or “philosophy of law” is done by lawyers (or jurists) or by
philosophers. Ideally, it should be done both by lawyers (or jurists) with a
philosophical background and by philosophers with a legal one.
Finally, the terms “legal theory”, “theory of law” and even “theory about
law” are much more broader by encompassing not only “jurisprudence” and
“legal philosophy” or “philosophy of law” but also theorizing from a variety of
other perspectives, including “law and economics”, “law and politics”, “law and
10

See Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart. The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (OUP

2004) 155-78.
11

See HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (OUP 1961; 2nd edn ‘With a “Postscript” edited by

Penelope A. Bulloch and Joseph Raz’, OUP 1994; and 3rd edn ‘With an “Introduction and
Notes” by Leslie Green’, OUP 2012); see also HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Stanford UP,
1963); HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility. Essays in the Philosophy of Law (OUP 1968);
HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham. Jurisprudence and Political Theory (OUP 1982); and, HLA Hart,
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (OUP 1983)
12

cf Solum (n 7) affirming that Hart “had a dominant influence in defining the content

of courses on philosophy of law in philosophy departments and jurisprudence in law schools”

literature”, “law and society”, as well as critical approaches, and so on.13 To the
extent, that Solum affirms that “legal theory” is “currently the best neutral term
for referring to legal theorizing, broadly understood.”14 Nonetheless, since there
is not a one and only method of theorizing about law, let me suggest that there
are several methodologies and hence legal theories.
III. Legal Theories and Methodologies
Let me start this section by quoting H.L.A. Hart’s clarification of the aims of his
legal theory and its basic methodological presumptions and presuppositions in
the “Postscript” to The Concept of Law:15
My aim in this book was to provide a theory of what law is which is both general
and descriptive. It is general in the sense that it is not tied to any particular legal
system or legal culture, but seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying account
of law as a complex social and political institution with a rule-governed (and in
that sense ‘normative’) aspect… My account is descriptive in that it is morally
neutral and has no justificatory aims: it does not seek to justify or commend on
moral or other grounds the forms and structures which appear in my general
account of law, though a clear understanding of these is, I think, an important
preliminary to any useful moral criticism of law.

At the outset of the clarification, we can identify two basic methodological
distinctions as applied to legal theories:
1) The distinction between general legal theories that respond to
“questions about what is common to all legal systems and cultures” and
particular legal theories that respond to “questions about what is specific to a
legal system or culture”;16 and
13

See, for example, Brian Bix, Jurisprudence: Theory and Context (3rd edn, Sweet &

Maxwell 2003)
14

See Solum (n 7) (emphasis original)

15

HLA Hart, “Postscript”, in Hart (n 11) 239-40

16

The distinction between “general and particular jurisprudence” can be traced all the

way back to Austin, see Austin (n 9) 372: “Particular [or National] Jurisprudence is the science
of any actual system of law, or of any portion of it.” See ibid 373: “The proper subject of
General or Universal Jurisprudence… is a description of such subjects and ends of Law as are
common to all systems”; cf Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and

2) The distinction between descriptive legal theories with explanatory
aims that respond to “questions about what the law is” or “questions about
facts”; and normative legal theories with justificatory aims that respond to
“questions about what the law ought to be” or “questions about values”.17
General
Legislation (first published 1789, JH Burns and HLA Hart eds, OUP 1996) Chapter XVII, §§ 219, 293-300 (referring to the different branches of jurisprudence and using the parallel
distinctions between “universal and internal, local, national, particular or provincial
jurisprudence”)
17

I am not only following Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing

2001) 1-28, and 29-49, but also adapting Hart’s distinction between “descriptive / explanatory
and normative / justificatory legal theory”, Hart (n 15) 239-40, which is parallel to Bentham’s
“expository and censorial jurisprudence”, see Bentham (n 16) Chapter XVII, § 21, 293-4: “A
book of jurisprudence can have but one or the other of two objects: 1. to ascertain what the
law is: 2. to ascertain what it ought to be. In the former case it may be styled a book of
expository jurisprudence; in the latter, a book of censorial jurisprudence” (emphasis original),
see also Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (first published 1776, JH Burns and HLA
Hart eds, Cambridge UP 1988) 7: “There are two characters, one or other of which every man
who finds any thing to say on the subject of Law, may be said to take upon him; --that of the
Expositor, and that of the Censor. To the province of the Expositor it belongs to explain to us
what, as he supposes, the Law is: to that of the Censor, to observe to us what he thinks it
ought to be. The former, therefore, is principally occupied in stating, or in enquiring after facts:
the latter, in discussing reasons.” cf Hart, Essays on Bentham… (n 11) 1-2, 41 and 137
However, I am also adopting both Arthur Ripstein’s distinction between “normative and
analytic jurisprudence”, see ‘Normative and Analytic Jurisprudence’, in IVR Encyclopaedia of
Jurisprudence,

Legal

Theory

and

Philosophy

of

Law

http://www.ivr-

enc.info/index.php?title=Normative_and_Analytic_Jurisprudence accessed 14 November 2014;
and, Larry Solum’s distinction between “positive and normative legal theory”, see ‘Legal Theory
Lexicon

016:

Positive

and

Normative

Legal

Theory’,

in

Legal

Theory

http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2003/12/legal_theory_le.html

Lexicon

accessed

14

November 2014
In Solum’s terminology “Positive legal theory seeks to explain what the law is and why it
is that way, and how laws affect the world, whereas Normative legal theories tell us what the
law ought to be… Or more simply: positive legal theories are about facts and normative legal
theories are about values.”

Descriptive /

Normative /

Explanatory

Justificatory

Particular

Furthermore, the clarification suggests that since there are there two
axis --the one distinguishing general and particular legal theories, and the other
descriptive / explanatory and normative / justificatory legal theories-- there are
four resulting quadrants that correspond to four initial possibilities: (1) general
and descriptive / explanatory legal theories; (2) general and normative /
justificatory legal theories; (3) particular and descriptive / explanatory legal
theories; and (4) particular and normative / justificatory legal theories. Moreover,
nothing precludes a more comprehensive legal theory that includes more than
one quadrant and that correspond to four additional possibilities combining:
(1) and (2); (3) and (4); (1) and (3); and (2) and (4); and, even a much more
comprehensive theory that integrates the four quadrants and a further
possibility combining: (1), (2), (3), and (4).18

General

18

Descriptive /

Normative /

Explanatory

Justificatory

(1)

(2)

Let me advance that for the purposes of this paper, I am especially interested in the

possibility of connecting (1) “general descriptive / explanatory legal theory” and (2) “general
normative / justificatory legal theory”, on the one hand, and (3) “particular descriptive /
explanatory legal theory” and (4) “particular normative / justificatory legal theory”, on the other
hand, and even the possibility of contrasting (1) and (3), on one side, and (2) and (4), on the
other. The only two options that I do not consider feasible because they will turn out to be
logically fallacious are connecting: (1) and (4); and (2) and (3); and, hence, they are completely
ruled out.

Particular

(3)

(4)

Traditionally, natural law theories do accept and even embrace the
normative dimension to the extent that they appear to be clearly justificatory,
whereas positive law theories reject it by claiming to remain (purely or solely)
descriptive, to the extent that they are explanatory.
On the one hand, additionally to Hart, John Austin and Hans Kelsen as
well as other positive law theorists, i.e. legal positivists, are representative of
(1). For example, Austin famously appealed: “The existence of law is one thing;
its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or not be is one enquiry; whether
it be or nor be conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A
law, which actually exists, is a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it
vary

from

the

text,

by

which

we

regulate

our

approbation

and

disapprobation.”19 Analogously, Kelsen --at the beginning of both editions of
his Reine Rechstlehre-- asserted:20
The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law. It is a theory of positive law in
general, not of a specific legal order. It is a general theory of law, not an interpretation
of specific national or international legal norms; but it offers a theory of interpretation.
As a theory, its exclusive purpose is to know and to describe its object. The
theory attempts to answer the question what and how the law is, not it ought to be. It is
a science of law (jurisprudence), not legal politics.
19

Austin (n 8) Lecture V, 184

20

Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Max Knight tr, 2nd edn, University of California

Press 1967) Chapter I, § 1, 1 (emphasis original); cf Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of
Legal Theory (Bonnie Litschewski Paulson and Stanley L. Paulson trs, OUP 1992) Chapter I, §
1, 7: “The Pure Theory of Law is a theory of positive law, of positive law as such, and not of any
special system of law. It is general legal theory, not an interpretation of particular national or
international legal norms. / As theory, the Pure Theory of Law aims solely at cognition of its
subject-matter, its object. It attempts to answer the questions of what the law is and how the
law is made, not the questions of what the law ought to be or how the law ought to be made.
The Pure Theory of Law is legal science, not legal policy.”

On the other hand, certainly Saint Augustine of Hippo and other
classical natural law theorists are representative of (2) since they appear to
hold that the normative exhausts the content and nature of the law or
alternately that the law is reduced to the prescriptive to the extent that “iniustia
lex, non est lex”, i.e. “unjust law is not law at all”.21
As already advanced, I am especially interested in the possibility of
connecting (1) and (2), on the one hand, and (3) and (4), on the other hand, and
even the possibility of contrasting (1) and (3), on one side, and (2) and (4), on
the other. Therefore, a legal theorist can not only be fixated in either describing
and explaining or prescribing and justifying, or both; but also be focused in
either what is common to all legal systems and cultures or what is specific of a
particular legal system and culture, or both.
Actually, following Bentham’s distinctions, nothing prevents a legal
theorist from exposing first what is specific of a particular legal system or
culture (3) and censoring it later (4). Analogously, also following Bentham,
nothing precludes a legal theorist from exposing first what is common to all
legal systems or cultures (1) and censoring it later (2).22 However, in the
remainder of this section, we will bracket the former possibility and will focus
on the latter possibility, i.e. the connection or not between (1) and (2).
In that sense, most legal positivists --following Austin, Kelsen and Hart-have insisted in the independence between (1) and (2) and have been claiming
to be committed exclusively to (1) by suggesting that whenever the normative /
justificatory dimension appears it is not longer law but morality what is at

21

See Saint Augustine of Hippo, On Free Choice of the Will (written in between 387-9

and 391-5, Thomas Williams tr, Hackett Publishing 1993) Book 1, 5, n. 11, 8: “an unjust law is
not law at all”; cf Saint Thomas Aquinas, On Law, Morality and Politics (selections of Summa
Theologica) (written in between 1265-74, Richard J. Reagan tr, Hackett Publishing 2002)
Question 95 “On Human Law”, Second Article “Is Every Human Law Derived form the Natural
Law”, 54: “Augustine says in his work On Free Choice: “Unjust laws do not seem to be laws”
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See Bentham (n 16) Chapter XVII, §§ 21-9, pp. 293-300

stake; and, hence, law can remain morally neutral23 or indirectly evaluative;24
and so have been labeled as “hard” or “exclusive legal positivists”. Similarly,
even those that admit that there are contingent relationships between (1) and
(2) seem to subordinate (2) to (1), due to the fact that it is the law, which
includes or incorporates references to morality,25 and even can be reduced
accordingly to a mere or pure conceptual analysis without normative /
justificatory aims,26 and so have been labeled as “soft”, “inclusive legal
positivists” or “incorporationists”. Moreover, some legal positivists have
conceded to different extent by recognizing the possibility27 and even the
necessity28 of connecting both (1) and (2). Finally, some natural law theorists,
following Saint Thomas Aquinas dictum “Non lex, sed legis corruptio”29 seem to
be adopting a form of weak natural law theory that connects both (1) and (2).
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Marmor,
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Analysis
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Jurisprudence)’, in Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa (eds), Philosophical Foundations of The
Nature of Law (OUP 2013); and, cf also Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence. Essays on
American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (OUP 2007)
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See Fred Schauer, ‘Positivism as Pariah’ in Robert P. George (ed), The Autonomy of

Law. Essays on Legal Positivism (OUP 1996); Solum (n 17); and, Adrian Vermeule, ‘Connecting
Positive and Normative Legal Theory’ (2008) 10 U Penn J Constl Law 387
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To conclude this section I will like to advance my claim that Dworkin’s
model is neither fixated in either describing and explaining or prescribing and
justifying, but in both, nor focused in either what is common to all legal
systems and cultures or what is specific of a particular legal system and
culture, but in both. Let me clarify that Dworkin integrates (1), (2), (3) and (4)
into a much more complex legal framework by combining the different
possibilities or more precisely by blurring the lines dividing them.30
Keep in mind that Dworkin not only blurs the lines diving the different
possibilities, i.e. general and particular, descriptive / explanatory and
normative / justificatory but also collapses the distinctions between creation
and application, between legislation and adjudication, and most notably
between theory and practice. For example, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin affirms:
on one side, “Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue
to any decision at law”;31 and, on the other, “Interpretative theories are by their
nature addressed to a particular legal culture, generally the culture to which
their authors belong”.32
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(OUP 1980; 2nd edn, OUP 2011); and, Mark C. Murphy, ‘The Explanatory Role of the Weak
Natural Law Theory’ in Waluchow and Sciaraffa (eds) (n 26)
30
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Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 90; cf Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (fin de

siècle) (Harvard UP 1997) 30-8
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ibid 102; see Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard UP 1985); and, see also

Ronald Dworkin, ‘Legal Theory and the Problem of Sense’ in Ruth Gavison (ed), Issues in
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IV. Dworkin’s Legal Theory and Methodology
In this section, I will like to revisit some features of Dworkin’s model, which we
can

characterize

as

being:

a)

constructive;

b)

interpretive

(and

even

argumentative); c) evaluative; and d) integrative.
a) Constructive. Ever since the publication of his book review on John
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice in 197333 and all the way to his Justice for
Hedgehogs,34 Dworkin distanced himself from a “natural” model and endorsed
a “constructive” one. The “natural” model presupposes a philosophical position
that describes an objective moral reality, which is not created by human
beings, but rather discovered by them, as the laws of physics: “Moral reasoning
or philosophy is a process of reconstructing the fundamental principles by
assembling concrete judgments in the right order, as a natural historian
reconstructs the shape of the whole animal from the fragments of its bones
that he has found.”35 On the contrary, the “constructive” model “treats
intuitions of justice not as clues to the existence of independent principles, but
rather as stipulated features of a general theory to be constructed, as if the
sculptor set himself to carve the animal that best fits a pile of bones he
happened to find together”.36 In his own voice:37
This ‘constructive’ model does not assume, as the natural model does, that principles of
justice have some fixed, objective existence, so that descriptions of these principles
must be true or false in some standard way. It does not assume that the animal it
matches to the bones actually exists. It makes the different, and in some ways more
complex, assumption that men and women have a responsibility to fit the particular
33

Ronald Dworkin, ‘The Original Position’ (1973) 40 U Chi L Rev 500 (reprinted as

‘Justice and Rights’ in Dworkin (n 1) 150-83; references will be made to this version)
34

Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 63-6; see ibid 63: “moral judgments are

constructed, not discovered: they issue from an intellectual device adopted to confront
practical, not theoretical, problems.”
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Dworkin ‘Justice and Rights’ (n 33) 160

36

ibid

37

ibid

judgments on which they act into a coherent program or action, or, at least, that
officials who exercise power over other men have that sort of responsibility.

b) Interpretive. Later on, in his exchange with Stanley Fish on legal vis-àvis literary interpretation38 and throughout his works, but especially in Law’s
Empire,39 Dworkin reinforces not only that the model is constructive and to
some extent creative but clarifies that it is not inventive but interpretive of the
practice. In other words, since law is an “interpretive concept” the proper
method requires a “constructive interpretation” of the practice. In that sense,
on one side, Dworkin is adamant in his criticism of “semantic theories of law”,
which he labels as “the semantic sting”, because they appear to consider the
concept of law as a “criterial concept”40 and even a “natural kind concept”41
with necessary and sufficient conditions, whereas it is an “interpretive
concept”.42 And, on the other, firstly, defines: “constructive interpretation is a
matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the
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See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Law as Interpretation’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 179 (reprinted in

60 Texas L Rev 527 (1982); in WJT Mitchell (ed), The Politics of Interpretation (Chicago UP 1983);
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Benn Michaels): Please Don’t Talk about Objectivity Any More’, in WJT Mitchell (ed) (n 38)
(reprinted in an altered and abbreviated form as ‘On Interpretation and Objectivity’, in A Matter
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Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature’ (1982) 9 Critical Inquiry 201 (reprinted in 60
Texas L Rev 551; in WJT Mitchell (ed) (n 38); cf also Stanley Fish, ‘Wrong Again’ (1983) Texas L
Rev 299
39

See Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5)

40

ibid 31-44; Ronald Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard UP 2006) 9-12; and Dworkin,

Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 158-9
41
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158-9
Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 10-2; and Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (n 5) 160-3, 403-5

best possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.”43
Secondly, delineates three stages of constructive interpretation:44
First, there must be a “preinterpretive” stage in which the rules and standards taken to
provide the tentative content of the practice are identified… Second, there must be an
interpretive stage at which the interpreter settles on some general justification for the
main elements of the practice identified at the preinterpretive stage… Finally, there
must be a postinterpretive or reforming stage, at which he adjusts his sense of what the
practice “really” requires so as better to serve the justification he accepts at the
interpretive stage.

And, thirdly, insists that its nature is interpretive rather than inventive:
“The justification need not fit every aspect or feature of the standing practice,
but it must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as
interpreting that practice, not inventing a new one.”45
c) Evaluative. Although in “How Law is Like Literature” Dworkin seemed
to diminish the evaluative as well as the descriptive in the process of
emphasizing the interpretative, at the end it was clear that he has been
endorsing a moral reading of the practice, which requires references to value

43
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model is not merely applicative but argumentative as well, see Imer B Flores, ‘¿Es el derecho
un modelo aplicativo?’ in Juan Federico Arriola Cantero and Víctor Rojas Amandi (eds), La
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the justification he proposes at the interpretive stage must fit the standing features of the
practice to count as an interpretation of it rather than the invention of something new.” See
also Dworkin, Justice in Robes (n 40) 15: “Any lawyer has built up, through education, training,
and experience, his own sense of when an interpretation fits well enough to count as an
interpretation rather than as an invention.”

and even value judgments that are not subjective but objective.46 On the one
hand, Dworkin affirmed: “propositions of law are not merely descriptive of legal
history, in a straightforward way, nor are they simply evaluative in some way
divorced from legal history. They are interpretive of legal history, which
combines elements of both description and evaluation but is different from
both.”47 On the other hand, he clarified (with the “rules of courtesy” as
example) that the “interpretive attitude” has two components, i.e. an
assumption that it has an objective value (or point) and a further assumption
that it is sensitive to it. In Dworkin’s voice:48
The first is the assumption that the practice of courtesy does not simply exist but has
value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle --in short, that
it has some point-- that can be stated independently of just describing the rules that
make up that the practice. The second is the further assumption that the requirements
of courtesy --the behavior it calls for or judgments it warrants-- are not necessarily or
exclusively what they have always been taken to be but are instead sensitive to its
point, so that the strict rules must be understood or applied or extended or modified or
qualified or limited by that point. Once this interpretive attitude takes hold, the
institution of courtesy ceases to be mechanical; it is no longer unstudied deference to a
runic order. People now try to impose meaning on the institution --to see its best light-and then to restructure it in the light of that meaning.
46
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47

Dworkin, ‘How Law Is Like Literature’ (n 38) 147

48

Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 5) 47 (emphasis original)

d) Integrative. In Law’s Empire Dworkin advanced his conception of “law
as integrity”, which is highly dependent on the idea of coherence and fit,49 but
in “Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy”,50 Dworkin --by
criticizing Hart’s defense of an Archimedean jurisprudence-- developed an
argument against a detached conception of values and for an integrated
49

See ibid 94-6, especially 96: “[Law as integrity] argues that rights and responsibilities

flow from past decisions and so count as legal, not just when they are explicit in these
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recognize what justice requires so that no practical conflict remains between justice and
legislative supremacy; we hope that departments of law will be rearranged, in professional and
public understanding, to map true distinctions of principle, so that local priority presents no
impediment to a judge seeking a natural flow of principle throughout the law.” cf Imer B Flores,
‘The Quest for Legisprudence: Constitutionalism v. Legalism’ in Luc J. WINTGENS (ed), The
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Legal Rationality Revisited: Towards an Integrative Jurisprudence’, in Waluchow and Sciaraffa
(n 26), 115-23
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conception of values. In a few words, Dworkin commences by affirming that “It
would make a little sense to treat the political values… as detached values”;51
continues by announcing that “political values are integrated rather than
detached”52 and by asserting that “Law is a political concept”;53 and, concludes
by avowing that this project “must find the place of each value in a larger and
mutually supporting web of conviction that displays supporting connections
among moral and political values generally and then places these in the still
larger context of ethics.”54
This claim, i.e. integrated values, advanced the thesis of the unity of
value, which was proclaimed at the beginning of Justice for Hedgehogs “This
book defends a large and old philosophical thesis: the unity of value”,55 and is
Dworkin response to the causes usually associated with foxes, i.e. value
skepticism, subjectivism, relativism and pluralism. Nevertheless, let me
reiterate that this thesis, in my opinion, can be traced all the way back to the
early publication of “The Model of Rules I” in 1967: “[principles] have a
dimension that rules do not --the dimension of weight or importance” and
“principles rather hang together than link together [as rules do]”.56
Furthermore, in the process of reinforcing his argument, Dworkin makes
a dual claim for “independence of morality from science and metaphysics”
(Hume’s principle) and for “interdependence of morality and ethics” (Kant’s
51
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each in the light of the others, organized not in a hierarchy but in a fashion of a geodesic
dome.”
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Justice for Hedgehogs and Partnership Conception of Democracy (With a Comment to Jeremy
Waldron’s “A Majority in the Lifeboat”)’ (2010) 4 Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del
Derecho 65, 67-8 fn 4; and Imer B. Flores, ‘Proportionality in Constitutional and Human Rights
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principle).57 In a few words, Dworkin attacked the Archimedean epistemology
and defended an integrated epistemology: “Our moral epistemology --our
account of good reasoning about moral matters-- must be an integrated rather
than an Archimedean epistemology, and it must therefore be itself a
substantive, first-order moral theory.”58 Likewise, he appealed not only to “the
character of interpretation and of interpretive truth and the independence of
both ethical and moral truth from science and metaphysics” but also to an
“interpretive integration of ethics and morality”.59
Finally, regarding law and morality, Dworkin, in an autobiographical
paragraph in Chapter 19 of his Justice for Hedgehogs, acknowledged --or more
precisely confessed:60
When more than forty years ago I first tried to defend interpretivism, I defended it
within this orthodox two-systems picture. I assumed that law and morals are different
systems of norms and that the crucial question is how to they interact. So I said… that
the law includes not just enacted rules, or rules with pedigree, but justifying principles
as well. I soon came to think, however, that the two-systems picture of the problem was
itself flawed, and I began to approach the issue through a very different picture. I did
not fully appreciate the nature of that picture, however, or how different it is from the
orthodox model, until I began to consider the larger issues of this book.

So instead of considering law and morality as two separate systems,
Dworkin has replaced it with a one-system picture, which now treats “law as a
part of political morality” and recalled the aim of the book: “Our aim has been
to integrate what are often taken to be separate departments of evaluation: we
can easily place the doctrinal concept of law in that tree structure: law is a
branch, a subdivision, of political morality.”61 What’s more Dworkin recognizes
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the existence of a difficult question and hints into its answer: “The more
difficult question is how that concept [i.e. law] should be distinguished to show
one as a distinct part of the other. Any plausible answer will center on the
phenomenon of institutionalization.”62
V. Dworkin’s One Right Answer Thesis Reconsidered
To conclude I will like to briefly reconsider Dworkin’s one right answer thesis in
the light of his constructive, interpretive (and even argumentative), evaluative
and integrative model. However, let me recall first its appearance and
development.
At the core of his criticism of legal positivism, Dworkin cautioned:63
To say that someone has a ‘legal obligation’ is to say that his case falls under a valid
legal rule that requires him to do or to forbear form doing something. (To say he has a
legal right, or has a legal power of some sort, or a legal privilege or immunity, is to
assert, in a shorthand way, that other have an actual or hypothetical legal obligations
to act or not to act in certain ways touching him.) In the absence of such a valid legal
rule there is no legal obligation; it follows that when the judge decides an issue by
exercising his discretion, he is not enforcing a legal right as to that issue.

According to this criticism, the judge that excercises discretion in hard
cases is not applying the already existing law but acting as if he was the
legislator to the extent of either creating new law or changing the existing one
and what is even worse he is doing it ex post facto, which amounts to a
violation of concrete principles such as the division or separation of powers and
the irretroactivity of the law and more abstract principles such as certainty,
generality, legality, and normativity. On the contrary, Dworkin claims not only
that the judge by appealing to the underlying justifying principles will still be
applying already existing law without having to create new law or to change the
62
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existing one but also that there is and even must be one right answer to every
legal question.
In the process of defending the one right answer thesis,64 on the one
hand, in the center of “Hard Cases”, Dworkin constructs an imaginary judge
named Hercules:65
[A] lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen, whom I shall
call Hercules… a judge in some representative American jurisdiction… [who]
accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of the law in
his jurisdiction…that is, that statutes have the general power to create and
extinguish legal rights, and that judges have the general duty to follow earlier
decisions of their court or higher courts whose rationale… extends to the case at
bar.

On the other hand, in the core of “Can Rights be Controversial?”,
continues with his defensive move: “My arguments suppose that there is often
a single right answer to complex questions of law and political morality. The
objection replies that there is sometimes no single right answer, but only
answers.”66
Notwithstanding, by the time of the original publication of his “No Right
Answer?”, his defense is already part of his attack: “For all practical purposes,
there will always be a right answer in the seamless web of our law.”67 Though
this sentence does not appear in the version republished as “Is There Really No

64

Although Stephen Guest used to emphasize that Dworkin’s “one right answer” thesis
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and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart (OUP 1977) 84

Right Answer in Hard Cases?”,68 I am certain that Dworkin did not change his
mind since, in 1996, in his “Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It”, he
insisted in his counter-attack: “This “no right answer” thesis cannot be true by
default in law any more than in ethics or aesthetics or morals.”69
What’s more, in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin distinguished between
indeterminacy and uncertainty: “But in all these aspects indeterminacy differs
from uncertainty. “I am uncertain whether the proposition in question is true
or false” is plainly consistent with “It is one or the other,” but “The proposition
in question is neither true nor false” is not.”70
In

a

few

words,

Dworkin

by

differentiating

indeterminacy

from

uncertainty, as he previously did by constructing Hercules, is able to separate
the lack of certainty, i.e. a final demonstration or proof, from the claim for
determinacy, i.e. a preexisting one right answer for every legal question being
already somehow “out there”.
Let me clarify that “out there” in Dworkin’s model means that the answer
is, on the one hand, not to be discovered (or deducted) but to be constructed,
from the already preexisting legal materials; and, on the other hand, not to be
invented (or created and even changed) but to be interpreted (and even argued
for), again from the already preexisting legal materials. Similarly, the one right
answer thesis can be constructed and interpreted from the already preexisting
legal materials because it can be evaluated from the underlying principles,
including moral ones, which are not only objective and justify the practice but
also integrated into law.
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Finally, against the critique that the preexisting legal materials may
appear to be contradictory and even incommensurable, Dworkin provides an
interpretation following his unity of value thesis that reconciles values by
showing that moral conflict requires a deeper form of collaboration to solve the
apparent conflict and even to figure out a point of comparison or contrast, to
the extent that somehow the one right answer will despite all still be available
in very crazy cases.71 For that purpose Dworkin develops a variation of the
drowning swimmer case, in which he first poses the problem and later reflects
upon it:72
One person clings to a life preserver in a storm that has wrecked her boat; sharks circle
her. Two other passengers cling to another life preserver a hundred yards away; sharks
circle them as well. You have a boat on shore. You can reach one life preserver in time,
but then not the other one. Assuming all three are strangers, do you have a duty to
save the two swimmers and let the lone swimmer die?
[…]
But if we approach the decision in another way --by concentrating not on
consequences but on rights-- it is far from plain that we should automatically save the
greater number. We might think that each victim has an equal antecedent right to be
saved, and we might therefore be tempted by a lottery in which each shipwreck victim
has at least one-third chance to be saved. (The sharks agree to circle while the lottery is
conducted.)

In sum, although most people will appear to be automatically inclined to
save two, due to the bare fact that they are more than one, it is far from clear
that that is a right answer. Actually, saving the greater number may seem to be
the right answer from a consequentialist approach, but not according to a
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principles and rights conception, in which each victim has an equal antecedent
right to be saved and must be treated with equal concern and respect, as
Dworkin has been advocating throughout his works, ever since the publication
of his Taking Rights Seriously and all the way to Justice for Hedgehogs,
including not only “Rights as Trumps” but also his Sovereign Virtue. The Theory
and Practice of Equality. In my opinion, all this reinforces the idea that the one
right answer is already presupposed by the dworkinian model, which not only
is

constructive,

interpretive

(and

even

argumentative),

evaluative

and

integrative, but also integrates among the preexisting legal materials the
human rights.73
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